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MR. NIEHOFF: The purpose of this paper is to examine early
estimates of outer planet atmospheric probe cost, evaluating
these estimates by comparison with past planetary projects. Of
particular interest is identification of project elements which
are likely cost drivers for future probe missions. Discussion is
divided into two parts: first, the description of a cost model
developed by SAI for the Planetary Programs Office of NASA, and
second, use of this model and its data base to evaluate esti-
mates of probe costs. Several observations are offered in con-
clusion regarding the credibility of current estimates and spe-
cific areas of the outer planet probe concept most vulnerable to
cost escalation.
Cost .Model
A cost model has been developed by SAI for the Planetary Pro-
grams Offices as an estimating tool for long-range mission planning.
The model is based on cost data from seven lunar and planetary
unmanned spacecraft projects completed (or in progress) between
the ten-_ear period 1964-1974. The model input requirements are
matched to the level of mission definition available from pre-
Phase A studies. The basic estimation parameter is direct labor
hours. The labor estimating relationships (LER's) are primarily
a function of subsystem weights due to the limited detail of pre-
Phase A data.
At the present time the cost model can be applied to flyby,
orbiter, atmospheric probe and soft lander mission concepts.
Features include non-recurring and recurring division of cost,
specified fiscal year dollars, project inheritance, and cost
spreads of estimates. The model will reproduce the costs of the
data base projects with a mean absolute error of 10%. The error
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goal for future program estimates is 20%. Initial test results,
shown below, indicate that this accuracy is achievable. A de-
tailed description of the cost model is given in Reference i.
For the purpose of this paper it is instructive to take a
closer look at the cost model data base, the method for translat-
ing labor hours into cost, and overall estimation accuracy. The
roots of any cost estimation procedure are buried in its data
base. The seven projects comprising the SAI cost model data base
are listed in Table i_I. The list includes almost all the lunar and
planetary unmanned spacecraft flown between 1964 and 1974, as well
as Viking which will be launched next year. With these data, it has
been possible to construct a model capable of estimating flyby or-
biter and soft lander mission costs. Atmospheric probes are also
modeled using Viking entry system cost data, although this single
project data point is considered tenuous and mismatched to smal-
ler entry probe concepts for Venus and the outer planets.
O
o
o
TABLE i0-i
SAI COST MODEL DATA BASE
Programs in Current Model
o Mariner Mars '64
o Surveyor
o Lunar Orbiter
o Mariner Mars '69
o Mariner Mars '71 (FY '72 status)
o Pioneer F/G (FY '72 status)
o Viking '75 (FY '72 status)
Programs Under Evaluation
o Mariner Mars '71 (complete)
o
o
o
Viking '75 (FY '74 status)
Mariner Venus/Mercury (complete)
Mariner Jupiter/Saturn (FY '74 status)
New Programs to be Added
o Pioneer Venus '78
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Also shown in Table I0-i are programs currently under evaluation
for updating and expanding the data base. The first two programs,
Mariner Mars '71 and Viking '75,involve updates to estimated run-
out costs for these programs in the original data base. The
Mariner Venus/Mercury program is a new addition which not only
will expand the data base, but is also proving useful for model-
ing inheritance savings. Mariner Jupiter/Saturn, a program just
getting under way, will further expand the data base and permit
refinement of model inheritance factors.
An important future addition to the cost model data base is the
Pioneer Venus '78 project. Cost data from this program are of
interest for the following reasons: (i) it is the first plane-
tary program involving atmospheric probes, (2) it will be only
the second program in the data base for spin-stabilized space-
craft, and (3) it is the first planetary program evolved under
low cost (expanded weight) guidelines. The Pioneer Venus '78 data
represent a significant improvement in the data base for esti-
mating probe costs. The evaluation of current probe estimates
(presented below) is only preliminary in nature as indicated by
the title of this paper. Low cost (expanded weight) program phil-
osophy, and its impact on cost modeling, will not be discussed
further here. Although a potentially significant alteration to
traditional estimating procedures, it is not immediately rele-
vant to the subject of this paper and must be treated in detail
to be properly understood.
Within, then, the cost model data base, manpower and dollar
costs are broken down into elements of two basic categories:
support categories and subsystem categories. The various ele-
ments within each category are itemized in Table 10-2. Elements
within the support categories relate to project functions and
non-flight hardware. Elements within the subsystem categories
are flight hardware. Table 10-2 illustrates how data base pro-
ject resources (dollars and manhours) are allocated across these
elements. The data are averages of all seven projects in the
data base.
TABLE 10-2
SAI COST MODEL ELEMENTS
(Comparison of Dollar _ and Labor Hour Distributions**)
Q Support Categories
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Cost
Program Management 5.3%
Systems Analysis/Sys. Eng. 4.0
Test 7.0
Quality Assurance & Reliability 4.7
Assembly & Integration 2.8
Ground Equipment 9.0
Launch/Flight Ops. 10.0
Subtotal 42.8%
IV_hnHours
5.4%
4.3
7.2
5.3
2.8
8.1
10.0
43.1%
Subsystem Categories
o Structure
o Propulsion
o Guidance & Control
o Communication
o Power
o Science
o Miscellaneous
Subtotal
Total
8.9
5.2
9.2
13.9
4.1
15.2
0.7
57.2%
lOO.0%
9.0
4.5
9.1
14.7
4.7
14.0
0.9
56.9%
100.0%
*w/o fee
**all-project average percentages of totals
i_=_," ,_
Several important observations should be noted from Table 10-2
relevant to NASA's planetary flight projects in general, and the
cost modeling procedure in particular. Some subsystem category
elements contain more subsystems than their names imply. Struc-
ture, for example, is actually a conglomeration of structure,
mechanisms, landing gear (when applicable), thermal control,
pyrotechnics and cabling. The reasons for combining subsystem
hardware are two-fold. First, certain component costs are diffi-
cult to separate from available project financial records. Second,
some hardware element costs can be modeled (with pre-Phase A
definition) better in combination than separately. Note in Table
10-2 that less than 1% of the total project man hours and cost are
unaccounted for (miscellaneous subsystem category element) using
the described element breakdown.
Direct labor hours, while an intrinsic understandable unit of
cost, is only part of a project's total cost. Material, burden,
ancillary support, and fee make up the remainder of required pro-
ject costs. Fortunately, due in part to NASA's rigid contracting
requirements, direct labor hours consistently accounted for 30%
.". of total costs within the seven-project data base. This result
has a maximum deviation of less than 3%. The close comparisons
between labor hour and dollar percentages, evident in Table 10-2
further illustrate that this is true at the project category level
as well as on totals.
Finally, note that the subsystem categories, science and com-
munications, are comparable in cost, and are the largest single
cost elements in automated lunar and planetary projects. This
point will be readdressed in the discussion of atmospheric probe
cost estimates below.
A schematic diagram of the SAI Cost Model, illustrated in
Figure i0-I summarizes the cost estimation process. Subsystem
direct labor hours are estimated, using the cost model LER's from
mission definition input parameters. These estimates can be re-
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duced if subsystem hardware inheritance from a previous project
is applicable. Total direct labor man hours are synthesized
from the subsystem labor estimate using additional LER's for the
project support category elements. The total direct labor hours
are converted to dollars by applying estimated labor wage rates
for the fiscal year cost output of interest. It is only at this
point the inflation factors are added to the estimate. The total
program cost (less fee, NASA management, and contingencies) is
computed by assuming that direct labor accounts for 30% of the
total cost.
An accuracy of <10% error has been demonstrated I by the cost
model in reproducing the project costs of the data base. This
result involved the estimation of 88 individual cost elements.
A statistical histogram of the 88 element errors is presented
in Figure 10-2. Ideally one would like the density function to
have a sharp spike entered around zero error and a relatively
rapid tail-off such that the probability of exceeding 2 or 3 mean
absolute errors is essentially zero. The actual distribution
has a sharper peak (greater density) within one mean absolute
error of zero than a Gaussian function, but the tail-off is slower
than desired. Estimation errors associated with the Surveyor
Project in the data base are mainly responsible for the negative
bias in the distribution. The mean error and mean absolute er-
ror taken over the remaining six projects in the data base are
only -$0.4M and $2.3M, respectively. The mean absolute error of
all seven projects is just 10% of total cost.
An error goal of <20% on cost model estimates of projects not
in the data base has been realized from limited applications to
date. Some test comparisons with completed projects and inde-
pendently estimated future projects are presented in Table 10-3.
On this sample of six cases the maximum error estimate is under
12%. Note that the six projects vary considerably in mission
concept, total dollar level, number of spacecraft, and period of
performance. The results are indeed encouraging. The negative
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bias in all the estimates, however, indicates some necessary re-
finement required in the estimating procedure.
Probe Cost Estimates
A certain degree of ambivalence exists with respect to planetary
entry probe cost data. On the one hand, considerable data exists
from earth reentry programs including test programs, military ap-
plications, and NASA manned projects. On the other hand, atmos-
pheric entry is only one function of planetary entry probes;
many of its systems and operations differ markedly from past re-
entry programs. To date the only planetary entry probe missions
flown have been the Venera and Zond series launched by the U.S.S.R.
Hence, despite the undeniable feasibility of planetary entry
probes, there is little or no historical data directly applicable
to the cost estimation of such probes. The situation is not al-
together hopeless, however, and a start must eventually be made
somewhere. The preliminary cost evaluation of outer planet entry
probes which follows, is presented with these thoughts in mind.
Considerable Phase A level analysis has been performed in the
last several years on the definition of a first-generation outer
planet entry probe concept. This effort includes several contrac-
tor studies as well as NASA in-house work at both JPL and ARC.
For practical as well as programmatic reasons, the options have
been narrowed to a Saturn-Uranus common probe design capable of
atmospheric penetration to at least i0 bars. The cost of three
flight articles and one spare is currently estimated at $40M (FY'74
dollars). This estimate is sufficiently detailed to be compared
with the cost model described above. Such a comparison should
highlight similarities and differences in cost between future
planetary probe missions and past automated lunar and planetary
spacecraft experience. It should also contribute to the process
of firming up the cost estimate of this outer planet probe concept.
A category element comparison of cost between the Probe Study
Estimate, PSE, and the SAI Cost Model data base (presented in
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Table 10-2) is illustrated in Table 10-4. The clear bars are PSE
cost percentages and the hatched bars are data base cost percen-
tages. It is apparent from a comparison of the individual bar sets
that the probe support category costs are less (by %), and the
probe subsystem category costs are more, than the averages from the
cost model data base. The ratio of subsystem/support cost for the
PSE is 2.6, whereas the data base indicates a more equal distri-
bution of 1.3. This difference is probably due more to the fact
that the PSE is only part of the cost of a complete probe mis-
sion than to any intrinsic difference between the construction of
entry probes and spacecraft. Adding the probe carrier bus esti-
mate, and non-probe launch and flight operations costs should bring
the subsystem/support ratio for the complete project in iine with
the data base.
There are, however, some real differences in cost distribution
within the subsystem category elements. Since the outer planet
probe concept is a passively stabilized device guided by the car-
rier _us no costs appear for guidance and control. However,
significant instrument and electronics packaging cons£raints must
be imposed to insure stability during entry and descent. Pack-
aging costs, precipitated by stability control, show up in the
structure element and, indeed, increase the structure cost per-
centage above the average data base value.
Two other subsystem elements are also considerably above the
data base averages - science and communications. The differences
are reconcilable if one accepts the notion that these subsystem
elements are more dependent in definition and cost on mission ob-
jectives than on the specific mission mode (flyby, orbiter, probe
or lander). In particular, there is no reason to believe the cost
of science and communications for probes should be any less than
non-imaging science and communications of a flyby spacecraft.
Since the total PSE is less than the cost of, say, a Pioneer flyby
mission to Jupiter, the science and communication cost percentages
for the probe will, therefore, be higher even considering the
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TABLE 10-4
COST DISTRIBUTION COMPARISON
Support Categories
o Program Management
0 Systems Analysis and
Engineering
o Test
o Quality Assurance and
Reliability
o Assembly and Integration
o Ground Support Equipment
o Launch and Flight Operations
Subsystem Categories
o Structure
O Propulsion and
Aerodeceleration
o Guidance and Control
o Communication
o Power
o Science
• Subsystem/Support Ratio
,__.._--outer planet probe data
"_"_cost model data base
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o Outer Planet 10-Bar Probe
o SAI Cost Model D_ta Base
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additional cost of imaging on the Pioneer spacecraft. Hence,
where these two subsystems were seen to be the largest cost ele-
ments in the cost model data base, they become even stronger cost
drivers of atmospheric entry probe costs.
As a second point of this assessment, the cost of the 10-bar
outer planet entry probe was reestimated using the SAI Cost Model.
The same assumptions of three flight articles and one spare, and
FY '74 dollars were used in making the estimate. Applying the
cost model without modification yielded a first estimate of
$64.9M compared to the PSE of $40M. After examining the esti-
mates of the individual subsystem elements, it was found that the
costs for the aero deceleration and power subsystems were too high
for the probe concept. The aero deceleration system LER was
based on only one data point, that being the much larger Viking
lander aeroshell. The power system LER was developed from data
which always included solar arrays or RTG's. The probe, of
course, only has a battery power source. Adjustments to these
two LER's yielded a lower second estimate of $58.8M.
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One more necessary change was found in a further review of this
second estimate. The cost model assumes that what it's estimating
is a complete program, which, of course, is not true for the probes.
As a result of the costs for ground equipment and launch and
flight operations charged to the probes was unrealistically high.
Modifying the ground support equipment and operations cost to
match the requirements of the probes part of a total flight project,
yielded a third and final estimate of $48.0M. A comparison of this
estimate with the PSE is presented in Table 10-5. The agreement
between the two estimates on a percentage basis is quite good. The
SAI cost model estimate, however, is 20% higher than the PSE on a
total dollar basis. In view of the paucity of actual probe cost
data available, it seemed prudent to conclude the comparison and
estimation exercise at this point.
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PROBE DATA/COST MODEL coMPARISON
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• Total Cost for Three Probcs
Distribution of Cost*
o Management/Design
o Science Instruments
o Probe
o GSE and Operations
Total
*Percent of Total
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Probe Data
$40M
6.3%
23.4
63.0
"/.3
loo. 0%
Cost Model
$48M
_. 5%
23.3
62.9
6.3
oo.0%
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Summar[
The most important point to be stressed, is the lack of any
directly applicable data base with which to compare present cost
estimates of the 10-bar outer planet common probe design. There
are similarities with past projects on a subsystem level, and the
Pioneer Venus Probe mission, just getting started, should provide
relevant cost data in the near future. But for the present, the
estimation and validation process of outer planet probe costs is
in an embryonio stage.
Still, the similarity between two estimates presented here is
encouraging, Based on the available definition of the probe de-
sign with the SAG recommended baseline payload, a reasonable pre-
liminary estimate of the probe cost for three closely spaced mis-
sions is $50M + 10M (FY '74 dollars).
This investigation of outer planet probe costs has also brought
out several interesting points relevant to the continued develop-
ment of the present 10-bar common design concept. Using the car-
rier bus for targeting the probe to the correct entry conditions
largely eliminates the cost of guidance and control, tradition-
ally 9% of a total project. The savings, however, is largely
offset by the difficult packaging of instruments, batteries and
electronics in the probe for atmospheric stability. The two
most costly subsystems of the probe are science and communica-
tions. This has been true in past lunar and planetary automated
missions, and appears to be even more apparent in the probe cost
estimates. There has already been discussion in this Workshop
about expanding the capability of the probe's science and communi-
cations. In pursuing those suggestions, one should recognize
that these may well be the cost drivers of probe missions. Finally,
the cost of the aero deceleration system seems quite reasonable,
provided, of course, that entry conditions remain within the
bounds of current and near-future laboratory simulation test fa-
ci lities.
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In conclusion, the concern over the lack of an adequate data
base from which to evaluate probe cost estimates is restated. The
necessary alternative is to closely monitor the developing defi-
nition of outer planet probes, so that significant excursions in
cost from present estimates are immediately identified.
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MR. HERMAN: One comment with regard to why the cost model is
useful to you and why we need this kind of study.
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The Space Science Board is holding is a summer study to assess
what can be done in the next five or ten years and to recommend
to NASA the optimum series of programs which yield the greatest
degree of science value per dollar. In order to provide meaning-
fu])'data to the summer study we have to have estimates of the pro-
grams that are in a relatively nebulous state. Some of the studies
conducted were only Phase A, and some were not even Phase A stud-
ies.
In order to define the important costs per fiscal year, the
nature of the summer study, by the way, is such that the Space
Science Board is going to look at several funding levels for the
Office of Space Sciences and on the basis of the various funding
levels, determine towards what series of programs we should pro-
vide assistance in our planning. On that basis, the closer our
estimates come to the actual cost of the program, the less prob-
lems we will have when we have to fight for the new program with
the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress. So it is
a rough job that we have and the data are being used for that
purpose. It is not just an endeavor to see how close we can
come to making a profit.
The other point I wanted to make, the thing that bothered me
about John's model is the fact that the Pioneer-Venus philosophy
is not factored to date. That is, you must rigorously constrain
your payload and yet allow yourself plenty of weight and volume,
but use the weight an___dvolume margins to bail yourself out of
trouble rather than a million dollars, as is the case with Viking.
That experience does not seem to be factored into your particular
model.
MR. VOJVODICH: Do you want to comment on that, John?
MR. NIEHOFF: Yes. Dan and I have talked about modeling "low-
cost" projects at some length. This is one reason why we are
very anxious to see the Pioneer-Venus project cost data. We
feel that by comparing PV '78 data against our existing data
base, we can determine to what extent low-cost expanded-weight
concepts really work. We do, indeed, expect to see differ-
ences in the Pioneer-Venus data if money is being saved by re-
moving weight constraints.
MR. CANNING: Do you plan also to add as available on mis-
sions the planning for the space shuttle, which, presumably,
is on the same basis of unlimited weight?
MR. NEIHOFF: Yes. As Dan Herman implied, one of the cri-
ticisms of the current model is that it is embedded in history
and does not reflect many new cost-saving ideas, particularly
those motivated by the space shuttle. We are very anxious to
incorporate data that is designed for shuttle launches. I am
also anxious to see how significant proposed cost savings will
be with the Space Transportation System.
MR. GEORGIEV: John, on the cost data that comes from the
ten-bar studies and in comparison to your cost model, are there
any particular elements of the cost that are significantly
farther out of bed than the twenty-percent differential that
you show? Are there any particular elements of the costing sys-
tem that are much different?
MR. NIEHOFF: Yes. The cost model estimate almost exactly
replicated the subsystem costs, but more than doubled the esti-
mate of support category costs. The largest dollar difference
was in the estimate of assembly, integration, test and quality
assurance - $6.2M. We were unable, however, to determine whether
this was a real difference or largely due to differences in book-
keeping cost allocations. You will recall that the percentage
comparison between the two estimates presented in Table 10-5
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showed much better agreement than this using a coarser distri-
bution of costs.
MR. SWENSON: Is the data handling system lumped into sci-
ence or communications?
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MR. NIEHOFF: Communications. It includes transmitter/
receiver assembly, data handling, storage, and antenna assem-
blies.
MR. HERMAN: I was going'£o say that the SAI results suggest
that in programs where we are going to use these payload effects
maybe a better variable than weight would be science wei@ht
since no data is derived from communications inherently. Actually,
that was a suggestion made by SAI.
MR. NIEHOFF: That is right. At the present _me, the com-
munication system is based only on communication weight para-
meters and evidence exists that science weight has an impact on
the cost of the communications system.
MR. HYDE: John, would you care to speculate, with regard
to forty-eight-million-dollar figure that you have shown up
there, if we had to incorporate the capability of the capsule
deflection maneuver and also sterilization?
MR. NIEHOFF: We saw some numbers earlier, by Bob DeFrees
of McDonnell-Douglas, on sterilization which I think were on
the order of eight million dollars, and we do not have sterili-
zation in this estimate. We havelooked at sterilization costs
in other programs and the $8M figure compares favorably with
those results.
As far as the probe deflection goes, the cost model does have
an estimating relationship for guidance and control. There is
X-20
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no money in that category in our estimate, since the ten-bar
probe is a passive device. I really have no idea what the ad-
ditional cost would be since I haven't seen any proposed hard-
ware for intrinsic probe guidance. A rough guess would be
about the same percentage of the total cost as reflected in the
cost model data base for this subsystem element. From Table
10-2 that percentage is 9.1% which would raise the cost by $4.8M
to $52.8M.
We are talking about putting deltas on an estimate that I
have said is very preliminary. I think we have a forty-million-
dollar estimate and a forty-eight-million-dollar estimate at the
present time, but the data base is so small that I don't believe
these kinds of extrapolation are realistic.
MR. VOJVODICH: I would like to reflect on what Dan Herman
said, too. Although we are talking about pre-project or phase
zero type cost estimates, as you know, the planning cycle is one
in which we frequently get locked into a'number that we have
to live with based on these types of numbers. So it is impor-
tant that the data reflect as much reality as possible.
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